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Global water policy and local payment choices in rural Africa
Rob Hope 1* and Paola Ballon1
Sub-Saharan Africa is least likely to meet the Sustainable Development Goal for safely-managed drinking water. Africa is estimated
to require at least three times more annual investment, as a share of the gross regional product, than any other region to achieve
‘basic’ drinking water for everyone by 2030. If rural water users are to share some of these costs then the performance of current
services needs to improve. In Africa, when a rural waterpoint fails, it takes a month or more to repair. We model water user choices
across maintenance service models delivered by public, private and community providers with trade-offs in speed of repairing
faults, payment levels and cash management. We find higher payments are associated with higher education and faster repair
times. Household wealth, sex of respondent, seasonality, and waterpoint congestion, reliability and quality all influence payment
choices. Understanding local payment choices provide behavioural clues to design more sustainable funding and service delivery
models to align global and local drinking water goals.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite the moral, economic and health imperative to provide
everyone with safe drinking water every day, Africa has struggled
to achieve or sustain global water policy goals.1–4 As we enter the
third wave of global development goals (2015–2030) following the
International Decade of Drinking Water and Sanitation
(1980–1990) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDG,
2000–2015), it is expedient to reflect why billions of dollars of
effort still leave over half the rural population of sub-Saharan
Africa without basic drinking water, making the region by far the
most underserved globally.1 Meeting the global MDG target for
improved water access can largely be attributed to progress in
China and India.5 Translating global water policy into meaningful
change in rural Africa requires a closer examination of the water
choices of the rural poor in three related domains, which can be
achieved by (1) considering drinking water as a composite good
with different attributes across service levels and management
arrangements, (2) understanding behavioural responses to alter-
native management models; and (3) exploring the payment
preferences of rural people to determine the extent to which cost-
sharing is socially-acceptable.
Drinking water attributes encompassing the quality, quantity,
reliability, proximity and affordability of the service are now
acknowledged as both a global development goal and a human
right.6 However, there is limited social choice mapping of these
attributes. For example, the global goal is to achieve to safely-
managed drinking water on-demand, on-site and free of
contamination for everyone by 2030. An estimated 2.1 billion
people lack this service level including almost everyone in rural
Africa. The second order, global goal is to achieve basic water
access which is an ‘improved service’ with a return collection time
of 30 min or less. Given the history of progress in rural Africa,
achievement of even basic water services for everyone by 2030
would be an unprecedented policy success. Indeed, the off-site
supply of improved water from handpumps and other infra-
structure poses a collective action challenge in managing a point
source used by multiple people for multiple purposes at different
times of the year.7,8
The institutional arrangement that emerged in the 1980s, and
has endured in rural Africa, is community-based management.9,10
It is a policy in which government and donors have funded the
installation of infrastructure with the community responsible for
funding ongoing operation and maintenance. The assumption is
that communities wish to manage their water supplies and are
capable of doing so effectively and equitably. These assumptions
have been questioned widely.11–15 But what is the alternative?
Urban water supplies in Africa have largely been managed by the
public sector, sometimes with good performance, if regulated
independently and monitored closely, but the majority are heavily
subsidised and perform poorly.16 Performance-based models have
recently emerged in rural water management with early evidence
that they may be an alternative service provider in a more plural
institutional arrangement between the state, market and com-
munity.17–20 These initiatives reflect renewed international devel-
opment attention to support capacity to plan, finance and
implement local solutions where government, private sector and
communities can forge a commitment to greater self-reliance to
deliver basic services for everyone.21 We explore this changing
policy landscape from the perspective of rural water users.
Policy design and water user choices
What is unclear is the behavioural responses of rural people to
alternative water supply attributes and institutional arrangements.
Social choice theory suggests there will be competing preferences
between attribute levels across water quality, reliability, afford-
ability and proximity. Which matters most will likely vary by
current water delivery performance, alternative water supplies,
education, wealth, gender and the institutional arrangement.22,23
Do women prefer water quality more than reliability? Do water
users have a preference between public, private or community
management? Current policy is agnostic on such points providing
a notionally ‘improved water source’ and assuming it will be
managed with affordable tariffs and reliable performance.
Increasing evidence disputes these assumptions but provides
limited evidence as to whether investing more in a reliable service
will elicit higher and more regular payments. Data from Ghana,
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Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda and Zimbabwe indicate when a rural
waterpoint fails it takes between 13 and 214 days to repair, with a
modal value of around one month.11,15,24–27 A related measure of
failure is downtime by functionality on the day of a visit. A study of
453,177 rural waterpoints in 38 African countries estimates an
average of one in four waterpoints is not working at any one
time.28 Given such long repair times carry high economic, social
and health costs, particularly for women and girls,29 we focus our
experiment on improvements in repair times to see how this
affects payment behaviours.
Multi-country evidence across Africa indicates systemic late or
non-payment for community waterpoints in rural areas.14,17,18,30
Which attributes of community water supply would elicit higher
and better payment behaviours? Methodologically, there is a
challenge in administering hypothetical, trade-off experiments
orally to people with limited or no education or familiarity with
such techniques. Here, we develop a pictorial format with careful
explanation and test cards to allow water users to make their
choices across competing alternatives or accept the current
situation (status quo). Without improved understanding of what
may incentivise user payments, public investments in infrastruc-
ture may provide limited financial returns and transient social
impacts, which may partly explain the unsatisfactory progress
achieved in rural water security in rural Africa to date.
A conceptual model summarises the discussion above and
anticipates the choice modelling specification that follows (Fig. 1).
We propose interactions between the payment behaviours of
water users and the water services. This explicitly recognises the
normative features of drinking water service levels for Sustainable
Development Goal 6.1, and contextualises them by ‘who’ provides
the service and ‘why’ people choose to pay, or not. Payment
behaviours are shaped by the profile of users and their motives.
Salient profile characteristics include the wealth, education
attainment, and water demand of the household, as well as, the
sex of the respondent. Water is considered a ‘normal good’ where
higher wealth is likely to be associated with higher demand.
Demand is related to both domestic (drinking, bathing, washing
and laundry) and productive uses, particularly livestock watering
from community water supplies in rural Africa.7,31 The sex of the
respondent is of importance given the gendered roles and
inequalities of water collection. For example, women in sub-
Saharan Africa are six times more likely than men to have the
burden of water collection duties.29 Motives to pay for improved
drinking water explore user concerns across dimensions of cost,
quality, accessibility, quantity, reliability, satisfaction with current
service levels, and seasonal demand to recognise the influence of
rainfall variation on demand.32 Water services are determined by
the service provider and the level of service delivery. The latter are
not homogenous but vary qualitatively and quantitatively by the
quality, quantity, reliability, affordability and distance. Service
provision policy has largely transferred responsibilities to com-
munities, the response to which we explore through investigating
user preferences to alternative models by local government or
private sector.
Tracing policy and practice from the 1980s
The study site is Kwale county on the south coast of Kenya (Fig. 2).
The location provides a unique historical context in the
emergence and adoption of community-based management of
handpumps in the 1980s, which has informed rural water policy
across Africa and Asia until the present day. Further, the
handpumps upon which most communities depend were
installed in this period and were linked to training and support
in village-level operation and management. The findings of the
time indicate community adoption of this behavioural model to
operate, finance and maintain handpumps used by community
members. Thirty years on it is instructive to review the extent to
which, and reasons why, water user choices still hold firm or have
shifted to alternative or hybrid approaches. By examining the
choice preferences of these communities we elicit insights into
how and why behavioural norms may have shifted from their
training and adoption of community operational, financial and
management practices. Rural and remote, the county has high
levels of poverty and a dependency on handpumps for domestic
and productive water uses.27 While a bi-modal rainfall pattern
provides an average of 1400mm per year, extended dry spells
lead to observed and sustained spikes in handpump usage as
alternative water supplies become unavailable.32 A sample of 531
handpump locations was used as a sampling frame for a
household survey administered in late 2013 and early 2014.30 At
each of the 531 functional and non-functional handpumps, a
stratified random sample of households provided 3500 house-
holds of which a random draw of 1560 households participated in
the choice experiment.
The experimental design identifies four-choice attributes with
varying levels (Fig. 3): (1) maintenance service provider (public,
private), (2) guaranteed days for repairs (2, 4, 6, 8), (3) cash
management (treasurer/cash, bank account, mobile money), (4)
monthly household payment (USD 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0). The status quo
option reflects community maintenance and the local payment
arrangements, which are commonly cash. An orthogonal, main
effects design generated 10 choice cards, each with two
alternatives and a status quo option eliciting 10 choice responses.
Attribute design emerged from examination of the literature
including a study of over 25,000 handpumps in Liberia, Sierra
Leone and Uganda concluding that “greater efforts are needed to
test and evaluate alternative models for managing handpump
water supplies”.13 The modelling strategy has two stages. First, a
conditional logit model (CLM) estimates the main attributes
followed by interactions across four hypotheses of behavioural
Fig. 1 Conceptual model of payment behaviours and drinking water services. Blue curved arrows: denote interactions between payment
behaviours of water users and water services. Black straight arrows: denote factors shaping payment behaviours, and demand factors
determining water services
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change: (a) multidimensional wealth, (b) education, (c) sex of
respondent, and (d) household concerns. Second, a latent class
model (LCM) specified by a discrete distribution of preferences to
estimate heterogeneity following the assumption the variance in
the error term is not constant but depends on individual
observations.33–36
RESULTS
Unpacking water use choices
Descriptive results indicate seven of ten households vote for the
choice alternatives with the remainder preferring to continue with
community management. Of the former, the majority require a
repair service within four days (66%), are willing to pay up to USD
1.0 per month (52%) with a majority preference for payment (Fig.
4, left panel), and are split between cash management by banking
(38%) or mobile money (34%) with preferences for private (58%)
or public (42%) management. In contrast, households preferring
community management are willing to accept repairs of more
than eight days (55%), do not want to pay (48%) and are satisfied
with a treasurer and cash storage (92%). For the change group,
reliability, distance and queuing (congestion) are the priority
concerns with current satisfaction with maintenance services
lower (63% vs 74%) than the status quo group. While water
quality, cost and seasonality have scores of lower concern (<20%),
seasonality is almost twice as important for those opting for
change (14%) than for those who prefer to stay with the current
water-maintenance service (8%). Plotting a cumulative density
functions of the wealth index, the function of the status quo group
lies always above the change group, indicating that the latter is
better off (Fig. 4, right panel). We find no difference in voting
preferences between men and women with the change group
reporting slightly higher education attainment.
Results from the CLM indicate a general pattern of disutility
from slower repairs, higher repair payments and use of mobile
payments, and of positive utility from external maintenance
provision from public or private suppliers (Table 1). The LCM
reveals preference heterogeneity between the probability of
being a member of Class 1 (45%) or Class 2 (55%). As explained
in the methods section, each latent class is inferred from the levels
of the attributes through multinomial logistic regression. Class 1
has increasing negative utility as repair times and payment levels
increase. In contrast, Class 2 has positive utility from repairs within
four days or a payment of up to USD 1.0 per month. Both classes
prefer external maintenance providers with a slightly higher
preference for public provision. Cash management preferences
are negative but non-significant for Class 1 whilst Class 2 has a
positive preference for a bank.
We start by assessing the interaction of choice attributes with
the profile of household by wealth, education and the sex of
respondent. Higher wealth is positively associated with a
preference for faster repairs and either public or private manage-
ment, as opposed to, the status quo for both classes. Higher
wealth and payment also have a positive effect but only for Class
1; Class 2 has a negative and significant effect. Higher education in
Class 1 is positively and significantly associated with preference
for faster repairs, higher payments, and either public or private
management. In contrast, higher education in Class 2 is associated
with rejection of public or private management, but is still
positively associated with preference for higher payments. Female
Fig. 2 Location of choice respondents in Kwale county, Kenya. Source: J. Katuva. The map illustrates locations of Kenya (upper left), the study
site (lower left) and the households (right)
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respondents in Class 1 have a positive association with faster
repairs and either public or private management, but reject higher
payments. In contrast, women in Class 2 will pay more but reject
public or private management. In summary, faster repairs provide
a positive and significant utility with higher wealth and education.
Preferences then split with Class 1 preferring public or private
management, which Class 2 rejects. Higher payment is positively
associated with higher education, but splits the two classes by
wealth and sex of respondent. The findings indicate increasing
education and wealth in a household are positively associated
with faster repairs and willingness to pay for the service.
Next we turn to household motives across our seven categories
(Fig. 5). If a household is satisfied with the current maintenance
system, they have a positive and significant association with more
repair days and not paying, but reject public or private manage-
ment. This pattern reflects Class 1, with the reverse pattern for
Class 2. This is intuitive in that if a community is currently
providing a good service, households may have little reason to
shift in the short term. Considering household concerns over
seasonal variability, which are related to periods of drought, we
again see an expected pattern where concerns are positively
associated with preference for faster repairs and payment for Class
1. The results are less clear for Class 2, though there is significant
and negative utility with paying even with seasonality concern.
In Class 1, households concerned with handpump reliability
gain positive utility from faster repairs and public or private
management, but negative utility from increasing payments. For
Class 2, the same concern for households has positive utility from
increasing payments, but with rejection of both public or private
management. Where distance is a concern, neither class wishes to
pay, with Class 1 preferring public or private management and
Class 2 rejecting both. Concerns with queuing at handpumps
provide the one example where households in both classes gain
positive utility from public or private management. Classes 1 and 2
households differ, with the former gaining utility from faster
repairs and paying, and the latter following the reverse pattern.
Households belonging to Class 1 exhibiting concerns for water
quality gain utility from faster repairs, but the same group have no
Fig. 4 Alternative payment preferences disaggregated by wealth quintiles. Box-plot legend. Centre line: denotes the median; bounds of the
box: denote the 25th percentile (lower hinge) and the 75th percentile (upper hinge); whiskers: denote the lowest (lower whisker) and highest
observations (upper whisker), respectively. Cumulative density functions legend. Blue thick line: denotes the cumulative density function of
wealth (index) for status quo voters; red line: denotes the cumulative density function of wealth (index) for voters opting for change
Fig. 3 Pictorial design of choice attribute levels (left panel) and test choice card (right panel). The left panel presents the attributes and levels
of the choice experiment, while the right panel illustrates three options for the pilot choice card, including two alternatives (option 1, option
2) and ‘no change’, which reflects the existing community management
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Class 1 Class 2
Dependent variable—Choice Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig.
Attributes I. Days to repair handpump 2 days 0.287 *** −0.949 *** 0.448 ***
4 days −0.209 *** −2.208 *** 0.220 ***
6 days −1.065 *** −3.481 *** −0.424 ***
8 days −0.813 *** −4.580 *** 0.286 ***
II. Household monthly payment USD 0.50 0.183 *** −0.901 *** 0.640 ***
USD 1.00 −0.035 n.s −1.928 *** 0.696 ***
USD 1.50 −0.643 *** −2.091 *** −0.187 ***
USD 2.00 −0.822 *** −2.055 *** −0.555 ***
III. Maintenance service provider Public 1.193 *** 2.825 *** 1.081 ***
Private 1.020 *** 2.731 *** 0.812 ***
IV. Cash management Bank account 0.090 n.s −0.360 n.s 0.344 ***
Mobile money −0.281 *** −0.295 n.s −0.239 *
Interactions Satisfaction with current maintenance Days of repair 0.010 n.s 0.456 *** −0.144 ***
Payment −0.080 *** −0.343 *** 0.086 ***
Public provider −0.354 *** 0.346 ** −0.700 ***
Private provider −0.236 *** 0.437 *** −0.564 ***
Bank −0.009 n.s −0.183 n.s 0.103 n.s
Mobile money 0.134 ** −0.108 n.s 0.211 **
Household wealth index Days to repair −0.054 *** −0.113 *** −0.046 ***
Payment −0.003 n.s 0.290 *** −0.203 ***
Public provider 0.261 *** 0.395 *** 0.208 ***
Private provider 0.256 *** 0.282 *** 0.317 ***
Bank −0.102 *** −0.035 n.s −0.167 ***
Mobile money −0.115 *** −0.140 * −0.087 n.s
Years of respondent education Days to repair −0.002 n.s −0.016 ** −0.001 n.s
Payment 0.008 *** 0.014 *** 0.023 ***
Public provider −0.013 n.s 0.248 *** −0.108 ***
Private provider −0.031 ** 0.227 *** −0.119 ***
Bank 0.023 ** 0.023 n.s 0.010 n.s
Mobile money 0.017 n.s 0.003 n.s 0.023 n.s
Female respondent Days to repair −0.094 *** −0.066 * −0.001 n.s
Payment 0.012 n.s −0.295 *** 0.066 ***
Public provider −0.089 n.s 2.065 *** −0.935 ***
Private provider −0.114 n.s 2.264 *** −0.930 ***
Bank 0.025 n.s 0.018 n.s −0.069 n.s
Mobile money 0.045 n.s 0.025 n.s 0.016 n.s
Seasonality concern Days of repair −0.146 *** −0.606 *** −0.033 n.s
Payment −0.024 n.s 0.360 *** −0.183 ***
Public provider 0.244 ** 0.125 n.s 0.235 **
Private provider 0.104 n.s −0.186 n.s 0.139 n.s
Reliability concern Days of repair −0.041 * −0.212 *** −0.017 n.s
Payment −0.089 *** −0.614 *** 0.068 ***
Public provider −0.043 n.s 0.730 *** −0.306 ***
Private provider 0.032 n.s 0.895 *** −0.273 ***
Distance concern Days of repair −0.094 *** −0.062 n.s −0.166 ***
Payment −0.141 *** −0.276 *** −0.125 ***
Public provider 0.199 *** 0.920 *** −0.202 ***
Private provider 0.152 ** 1.015 *** −0.292 ***
Queuing concern Days of repair 0.037 n.s −0.436 *** 0.148 ***
Payment 0.089 *** 0.475 *** −0.116 ***
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significant result for payment. Households in both classes reject
public or private management if concerned by water quality.
Finally, households concerned with current costs of services have
a preference for faster repairs and payment though without
support for public or private management. For Class 2, households
concerned with current costs result in negative utility from
increasing payments, and a positive preference for public or
private management.
DISCUSSION
Behavioural clues to unlock user payments
Our results reveal behavioural clues as to why investments in
community waterpoints remain an enduring development
challenge in rural Africa. Choice heterogeneity specified across
service levels by different management arrangements illustrate
the significant variation in demand for faster repairs to community
water supplies. Provision of a unitary service level does not meet
the varying preferences of household water users. Education,
wealth and gender moderate choices with all three positively
associated with utility gains from faster repairs for Class 1, but only
wealth positively influencing preference for faster repair for Class
2. Payment choices are positively shaped by wealth and education
for Class 1, and education and sex of respondent for Class 2.
Increasing education appears a critical and cross-cutting priority in
nudging welfare-enhancing behaviour, which builds on wider
literature on how public investments in rural water infrastructure
may bypass the poor without ancillary investments in education,
particularly for women.37
Women’s choices are not uniform but diverge across the two
classes challenging simple assumptions of preference homoge-
neity. Of note are the payment preferences of women in Class 2
who will pay but do not gain utility from faster repairs, or public or
private management. It is an unexpected result that women who
often have most to lose from non-functioning water infrastructure
appear to gain no utility from faster repairs. It is plausible that
Class 2 women have lower education compared to Class 1 women,
and align more to the status quo group, given negative utility
associated with public or private management. However, there is
the separate but important finding which distinguishes Class 2 in
their specific concern with water quality, which is positively
associated with payments. While the crude classification of ‘water
quality’ is not qualified by the bacteriological, chemical or
aesthetic issues influencing this concern, or by our knowledge
of the extent and severity of the disease burden in the household,
the fact that this motivation influences payment for this majority
class holds potential traction in improving the regulatory and
monitoring frameworks for rural drinking water. If water users
view water quality as a priority concern, this may unlock payment
behaviours to encourage water safety plans and monitoring





Class 1 Class 2
Dependent variable—Choice Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig.
Public provider 0.618 *** 0.825 *** 0.677 ***
Private provider 0.563 *** 0.624 *** 0.712 ***
Water safety concern Days of repair −0.049 n.s −0.421 *** 0.008 n.s
Payment 0.116 *** −0.034 n.s 0.227 ***
Public provider −0.250 *** −0.631 *** −0.634 ***
Private provider −0.447 *** −0.789 *** −0.849 ***
Concern with current costs Days of repair 0.045 n.s −0.179 ** 0.064 *
Payment 0.081 *** 0.312 *** −0.068 **
Public provider −0.029 n.s −0.689 *** 0.312 ***
Private provider −0.057 n.s −0.915 *** 0.318 ***
Model summary
# of observations; # of parameters 15,600; 60 15,600; 121
Log likelihood at convergence −15492.22 −13677.48
Pseudo R² 0.0502 (adjusted) 0.2019 (McFadden)
Information Criteria AIC 31104.4 27597
Normalised AIC 1.994 1.769
Probability of class membership n/a 45%*** 55%***
***, **, *Denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels respectively. – denotes non significance
Fig. 5 Summary of the latent class model results by household
profile and motives. The thumbs up (down) emoji denote a positive
(negative) and statistically significant coefficient in the latent class
model. The prohibited emoji denotes a not statistically significant
coefficient
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sharing arrangements between public investments and private
interests.
Cost-sharing arrangements will require improved, community
financial management, particularly the collection and safe storage
of water payments. This poses related questions on the
acceptability of more transparent and lower transaction cost
financial systems, such as mobile money or banking, which gain
limited support from this experiment. The political economy of
managing ‘cash’ in rural communities is often opaque, and
communities often struggle with cash management when failure
events for waterpoints occur, resulting in delays of weeks or
months before communities can agree how to replace ‘lost’
money to pay for repairs.10,13,14,17 While the descriptive results
indicate a high proportion of users voting for change, supportive
of more accountable banking or mobile money approaches, the
modelling results are less optimistic. Class 2 members do associate
positive utility with banking of water payments but, like Class 1,
they reject mobile money. Given the sensitive nature of managing
money in rural communities, it is not surprising to see caution in
leaping to a solution without more knowledge and assurances.
However, the result signals this is likely to be a non-trivial exercise,
with wider work of observed payment records in the study site
illustrating systemic late, or non-payment within communities
distinguished by multi-decadal, water payment collection.30
The motivations for households to pay for faster repair services
centre on concerns with seasonality, current costs and handpump
congestion (queuing time) for Class 1, and water quality and
reliability for Class 2. Shorter distance to the handpump and
increased reliability, may create utility but do not unlock payments
for Class 1. Where there is dissatisfaction with current manage-
ment this also elicits positive payment behaviours. With alter-
native water supplies from surface water during wetter periods,
there is less dependency on groundwater until drought events
occur. This also relates to the concern with congestion as strategic
waterpoints then face peak demand. It is noteworthy that distance
and reliability are not significant, though one may consider
congestion as a sub-set of reliability. If the handpump is not
working then congestion effects are likely to increase.
The third significant motivation is concern with current costs,
which touches on the importance of global monitoring afford-
ability as a normative indicator of the human right to water.1,6
Community management of rural handpumps is largely unregu-
lated in Kenya, and most of Africa, and pricing is a local matter
with evidence that community handpumps often become semi-
privatised to become a ‘club good’ with a variety of membership
arrangements, which may exclude some users.16 Following Class
2’s positive association of utility with banking, their concern with
current costs is negatively associated with payments, but
positively associated with public or private management. This is
the one of three concerns where Class 2 gains utility from non-
community management, and suggests where current costs are
unreasonable, and thus wider support may be justified and
welcome. In contrast, Class 1’s concerns with costs gain utility
from payments but reject public or private management. This
suggests users have distinct preferences for financial roles and
responsibilities between community and external partners, and
the associated requirement to negotiate an acceptable approach
over time.
Water quality is the one significant motivation for payment by
Class 2. Like affordability, global monitoring struggles to make
progress on robust water quality metrics in rural areas.1,4 This
partly reflects the distinct methodological and operational
challenge of generating accurate data given current methods
and levels of investment. Testing for bacteria, viruses, or harmful
chemicals, such as arsenic or fluoride, require capacity, resources
and data quality assurance which is challenging using both
current and emerging techniques. The finding that users
identifying water quality concerns reject public or private
management is instructive given the significant technical chal-
lenges of monitoring quality. This requires further investigation.
Global policy as risk allocation and value creation
Slow and uneven progress for drinking water service delivery in
rural Africa demands new thinking to design alternative institu-
tional models to unlock payment behaviours for faster repairs in
days rather than weeks. Households choosing community
management in rural Kenya accept or are resigned to lower
levels of service performance with reluctance or inability to pay.
This does not create a binary division between private and public
ideologies of service delivery. It focuses attention on how to fairly
and effectively allocate operational and financial risks aligned to
public policy goals, recognising communities will play a central
role in any sustainable institutional model. Unlocking user
payment behaviours is foundational to attract alternative forms
of sustainable finance and reinforce the primacy of delivering high
quality services which create value for people with often limited
and variable income. Delivering reliable drinking water services of
good quality, at waterpoints without long queues and in times of
drought are contextual attributes to improve water payment
behaviours to meet and sustain global policy goals.
METHODS
Experimental design and analysis
Unlike text-based, choice cards, we chose to use images to represent the
attributes under investigation to promote inclusive participation, particu-
larly women in households as they commonly are responsible for water
collection and management. A careful process of designing and testing the
cards led to a final format to represent: (a) number of days to repair the
handpump, (b) maintenance service provider, (c) cash management
system and (d) level of household monthly payment. Days to repair was
represented by a sun and spanned 2, 4, 6 or 8 days. The range reflected
wider analysis and an improvement on the current average of a month to
repair broken handpumps.13 The maintenance service provider introduced
public and private providers with the status quo reflecting the community
management model common across Kenya and Africa. Cash management
included storing payments in a bank, which has been recommended since
the late 1980s, and the increasing prevalence of mobile money systems in
Kenya. Mobile money is a technology to transfer, receive and store money
using a mobile phone. Globally, there are 866 million users processing USD
1.3 billion per day.38 The technology has increased access for unbanked
people in rural Africa and Asia where traditional banks and banking
systems have failed to reach or benefit poor people. The status quo reflects
the common situation of the water committee, through the treasurer or
Chair, holding the cash. Monthly payments considered current payment
levels and seasonal variability to centre on a range from USD 0.50 to USD
2.00 per household per month. Kenyan Shilling notes in denominations of
50 were used to represent these values with the exchange rate (KES 100=
USD 1.0, 2013). The test (dummy) card below illustrates the application
which ran smoothly in the field (Fig. 3).
The attributes followed a main effects design with 10 choice cards per
household to elicit 15,600 observations with two choice alternatives and
the status quo per observation (n= 46,800).
Data collection
In 2013, a water point survey identified 574 handpumps of which 45%
were non-functioning on the day. Excluding locations where handpumps
were abandoned, a sample of 531 handpump locations was used as a
sampling frame for a household survey administered from October 2013 to
February 2014. At each of the 531 handpumps, a stratified random sample
of households from transect walks in roughly cardinal pathways of up to
2 km away from the handpump generated a sample of 3500 households. A
pilot survey was conducted with 19 enumerators recruited from
communities across the study area who administered the survey in local
languages (Swahili, 54%; Digo, 43%; Duruma, 2%; other, 1%). The main
survey provided an introduction including ethics and informed consent,
then sections on household demographic, socio-economic, water beha-
viours, welfare and concerns. All respondents were adults (>18 years) and
generally the ‘mother’ or ‘father’ in the household. Where a household was
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unavailable, one return trip would be made and if no one was available, a
random replacement near the household would be selected. The choice
experiment was administered as a random draw of roughly half of the full
sample. This included a structured explanation with laminated cards for
the ‘test card’ and the 10 choice cards. Data were collected on tablets
using doforms software (www.doforms.com), uploaded to a server each
evening by the field teams supported by University of Oxford staff for local
and remote analysis to allow guidance to the enumerators on a daily basis.
Ethical permission for the experiment was provided by the Central
University Research Ethics Committee (CUREC) at the University of Oxford
and a research permit from the Government of Kenya’s National Council
for Science and Technology.
Econometric modelling
Following this analytical approach, the econometric specification considers
two types of models: a CLM and a LCM. In the CLM, an individual is
assumed to have preferences defined over a set of unordered alternatives
indexed by 1, 2,…, J. Let yij be an indicator variable for the alternative
actually chosen by the i-th individual, that is, yij= 1 if individual i chose
alternative j and 0 otherwise. The exogenous variables in this type of
specifications are of two types: alternative specific, denoted by x and
individual specific, denoted by z. Alternative-specific variables xij vary
among the alternatives (as well as among individuals), reflecting the
attribute levels of each option. Individual-specific variables zi vary only
among individuals and provide information on the socio-economic profile
of each person. While modelling these effects is often useful when the aim
is to assess general profiles, our interest here is in the interaction between
individual characteristics and attribute levels. These interactions provide a
more comprehensive assessment of the effect of profile characteristics on
the choice mode. Assuming we have p alternative-specific variables, and q
individual-specific ones our random-utility model can then be expressed
as:
Uij ¼ βTxij þ ΓTwij þ εij (1)
where Uij denotes the utility of the i-th individual associated with option j;
β and xij are p × 1 vectors of alternative-specific regression coefficients and
variables, respectively. The interaction effects between alternative-specific
variables and individual-specific ones is represented by the matrix eWij of
size p × q, with typical element [xijk × zl] for k= 1,…, p and l= 1,…, q. As Eq.
(1) is a scalar, we vectorise the matrix eWij using the vec ð Þ operator leading
to a vector of interaction effects wij ¼ vec eWij
h i
of size pq × 1, and to an
associated vector of regression coefficients Γ of size pq × 1.
The disturbances εij in this framework denote individual heterogeneity
and are assumed to be independently and identically distributed (IID) with
the same Type I extreme value distribution:
F εij
  ¼ exp  exp εij
  
: (2)
Under these assumptions the probability that individual i choses
alternative j is:
Prob Uij > Uim
 
for allm≠ j; (3)
and it has been shown39 that for independent extreme value (Gambel)
distributions, as in (2) above, this probability is:
πij ¼ Prob yim ¼ j½ 






where yim is the index of the choice made. The model defined by (3) is
estimated through Maximum Likelihood.40 Note that the IID assumptions
made about εij are quite stringent and induce the ‘Independence from
Irrelevant Alternatives’ or IIA property that is inherent to the CLM.
To overcome the limitation imposed by the IIA property we specify a LCM.
This model accounts for parameter heterogeneity across individuals through
a discrete distribution or set of classes unknown to the researcher. Estimates
consist of the class specific parameters and for each individual, a set of
probabilities defined over the classes. Within the class, choice probabilities
are assumed to be generated by a multinomial logit model. For a given
individual, the model’s estimate of the probability of a specific choice is the
expected value (over classes) of the class-specific probabilities.39
The latent class specification following the matrix design presented
above, determines in our case a two-class model as the preferred option.
With a normalised AIC criterion of 1.769 this specification leads to an
improvement in pseudo-R2 from 0.05 (CLM) to 0.20 (LCM). Two classes
were specified with a 45 per cent and 55 per cent likelihood of selection
(Class 1 and Class 2, respectively).
Version 5 of the NLOGIT software40 modelled the conditional logit and
latent class specifications. Descriptive analysis was run in Excel, SPSS and
STATA 14.
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